Economics Ph.D. Candidate · Concordia University

Yuxing Liang

Market Design · Matching Theory · Applied Microeconomic Theory

I am on the academic job market this year and welcome inquiries about faculty, lecturer, and postdoctoral positions in market design, matching theory, and applied microeconomic theory.

Contact Me

I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at Concordia University and a market-design theorist working primarily in matching theory. I study how matching and assignment mechanisms shape incentives, preference reporting, and allocation outcomes.

My research combines formal theory with computational analysis, simulation, and empirical analysis. These complementary methods help me derive theoretical results, test their boundaries, and evaluate their importance in matching markets.

Fields
Market Design; Matching Theory; Applied Microeconomic Theory
Research Interests
Strategy-proofness; preference elicitation; assignment mechanisms; school choice; college and major assignment
Additional Methods and Strengths
Computational analysis; simulation; empirical analysis
Research Supervision
Supervisor: Szilvia Pápai
External research advisor: Xintong Han

Job Market

Job Market Paper


Research

Research Agenda and Working Papers

Working Paper · Submitted

Towards a Better Major Assignment: An Empirical Study with Students in China

with Xintong Han and Yan Zeng

This paper studies centralized major assignment in Chinese higher education using students' mock and official rank-order lists, entrance-exam records, and information about their application environment. We document how students revise their choices as they learn about competition for majors and estimate their preferences using discrete-choice methods.

We then use the estimated preferences to compare alternative assignment mechanisms through counterfactual analysis. The comparison evaluates welfare, first-choice placement, distributional outcomes, and the treatment of lower-ranked and female students. By connecting observed preference formation to mechanism performance, the paper provides an empirical market-design analysis of college major assignment.

Major assignment Empirical analysis Discrete choice Mechanism comparison
Work in Progress

Progressive Choice Mechanisms in School Choice Problems

with Szilvia Pápai

This paper studies a family of school-choice mechanisms that varies how many options each student may access at each step. Under common priorities, the family connects Immediate Acceptance, intermediate Chinese parallel mechanisms, and Serial Dictatorship; under school-specific priorities, its fully permissive endpoint is student-proposing Deferred Acceptance. We characterize efficiency and how expanding choice opportunities changes manipulability, and we study the corresponding stability trade-offs.

Work in Progress

Bridging Theory and Evidence: How External Information Transforms Students' Application Decisions

This project investigates how information and application environments affect students' submitted preferences, assignment outcomes, and the empirical interpretation of preference-revelation behavior.

Selected Presentations

  • False but Harmless? Misreporting under Strategy-Proof Matching, 18th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, University of Tokyo, 2026. Presentation slides.
  • Progressive Choice Mechanisms in School Choice Problems, 14th Conference on Economic Design, University of Essex, 2025.
  • Progressive Choice Mechanisms in School Choice Problems, 17th Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare, Paris School of Economics, 2024.
  • Towards a Better Major Assignment: An Empirical Study with Students in China, Concordia Economics Department Lunch Seminar, 2023.
  • Towards a Better Major Assignment: An Empirical Study with Students in China, Urban and Education Economics Seminars, Shandong University, 2023.
  • Towards a Better Major Assignment: An Empirical Study with Students in China, 13th Conference on Economic Design, Universitat de Girona, 2023.
  • Towards a Better Major Assignment: An Empirical Study with Students in China, 18th CIREQ Ph.D. Students' Conference, Concordia University, 2023.

Complementary Strengths

Computational Methods for Matching Research

Computation is integrated into my matching research. I implement assignment mechanisms, enumerate finite markets, search for counterexamples, verify conjectures, and run simulations that clarify how theoretical boundaries change across market environments.

Empirical analysis complements the theory. I construct reproducible preference and assignment datasets, estimate discrete-choice models, and connect observed rank-order lists to mechanism-based counterfactuals in college and major assignment.

Matching + Computation + Data
Python, MATLAB, Stata, R, LaTeX, and Git; mechanism simulation, discrete choice, reproducible analysis, and visualization.
Assignment algorithms Market simulation Counterexample search Discrete-choice analysis Reproducible workflows
Matching and Assignment Simulation

Implementation and comparison of Serial Dictatorship, Immediate Acceptance, Deferred Acceptance, Top Trading Cycles, and Progressive Choice mechanisms.

Preference and Assignment Data

Discrete-choice estimation, rank-order-list analysis, counterfactual assignment, and reproducible empirical workflows.

Theory Development

Finite-market enumeration, computational stress tests, counterexample searches, and robustness checks for matching-theory conjectures.


Teaching

Teaching Experience

I have taught and assisted courses in microeconomics, macroeconomics, econometrics, industrial organization, game theory, health economics, the Asia-Pacific Rim economies, environmental economics, and many other undergraduate and graduate courses at Concordia University.

Lecturer

ECON 377, The Asia-Pacific Rim Economies
ECON 221, Statistical Methods I
ECON 491/591, Environmental Economics
ECON 436/536, Economics of Taxation
ECON 332, Introductory Financial Economics I

Tutorial Leader

ECON 612, Microeconomics I

Teaching Assistant

Intermediate Microeconomic Theory; Empirical Industrial Organization; Industrial Organization; Game Theory; Econometrics; Health Economics; Principles of Microeconomics and Macroeconomics


Selected Recognition

Selected Scholarships and Awards

FRQSC Doctoral Research Scholarship (B2Z)

Fonds de recherche du Québec, the 1st place out of all candidates

2023–2026

Graduate Fellowship

Concordia University

2020–2024

Professor Jaleel Ahmad Scholarship

Concordia University

2021–2022

View full CV


Contact

Contact

Yuxing Liang

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics
Department of Economics, Concordia University

1455 De Maisonneuve Blvd. W.
Montréal, QC, Canada · H3G 1M8

yuxing.liang@mail.concordia.ca

I welcome inquiries about my research, seminar presentations, academic positions, postdoctoral opportunities, and research collaborations.